Adversarial robustness has become a central goal in deep learning, both in theory and practice. However, successful methods to improve adversarial robustness (such as adversarial training) greatly hurt generalization performance on the clean data. This could have a major impact on how adversarial robustness affects real world systems (i.e. many may opt to forego robustness if it can improve performance on the clean data). We propose Interpolated Adversarial Training, which employs recently proposed interpolation based training methods in the framework of adversarial training. On CIFAR-10, adversarial training increases clean test error from 5.8% to 16.7%, whereas with our Interpolated adversarial training we retain adversarial robustness while achieving a clean test error of only 6.5%. With our technique, the relative error increase for the robust model is reduced from 187.9% to just 12.1%.
Introduction
Deep neural networks have been highly successful across a variety of tasks. This success has driven applications in areas where reliability and security are critical, including medical imaging, face recognition [14] , self-driving cars [3] , health care, and malware detection [11] . Security concerns emerge when adversaries of the system stand to benefit from a system performing poorly. Work on Adversarial examples [15] has shown that neural networks are vulnerable to attacks perturbing the data in imperceptible ways. Many defenses have been proposed, but most of them rely on obfuscated gradients [1] to give a false illusion of defense by lowering the quality of the gradient signal, without actually improving robustness [1] . Of these defenses, only adversarial training [10] was still effective after addressing the problem of obfuscated gradients.
However, adversarial training has a major disadvantage: it drastically reduces the generalization performance of the networks on clean data samples, especially for small networks. For example, [12] reports that adding adversarial training to a specific model reduces test performance from 92.7% to 79.4% on the clean CIFAR-10 test split. This phenomenon makes adversarial training difficult to use in practice. If the tension between performance and security turns out to be irreconcilable, then many systems would either need to perform poorly or accept vulnerability, a situation leading to great negative impact.
Our contributions: We propose to augment the adversarial training with the interpolation based training, as a solution to the above problem.
-We demonstrate that our approach substantially improves accuracy on clean test samples while still achieving adversarial robustness, using benchmark datasets (CIFAR10 and SHVN) and benchmark architectures (Wide-ResNet and ResNet): Section 4.1.
-We demonstrate that our approach does not suffer from obfuscated gradient problem by performing black-box attacks on the models trained with our approach: Section 4.2. -We perform PGD attack of higher number of steps (upto 1000 steps) and higher value of maximum allowed perturbation epsilon, to demonstrate that the adversarial robustness of our approach is not compromised by stronger attacks: Section 4.3.
-We demonstrate that the networks trained with our approach have lower complexity, hence resulting in improved accracy on clean test samples: Section 4.4.
Related Work
The trade-off between accuracy on clean examples and adversarial robustness has been observed in [12] and studied in the particular context of deep neural networks and radial basis function networks in [7] . While [7] found that adversarial training with FGSM improved clean test accuracy on MNIST, it has been found that adversarial training, especially on harder tasks and using strong attacks (such as PGD), tends to significantly degrade clean test accuracy [12] . Our results on SVHN and CIFAR-10 (Section 4.1) also consistently show degraded test accuracy with PGD adversarial training. In our work we primarily concern ourselves with adversarial training, but techniques in the research area of provable defenses have also shown a tradeoff between robustness and generalization on clean data. For example, the dual network defense of [9] reported 20.38% clean test error on SVHN for their provably robust convolutional network (most non-robust models are well under 5% test error on SVHN). [19] reported a best clean test accuracy of 29.23% using a convolutional ResNet on CIFAR-10 (most non-robust ResNets have accuracy of well over 90%). Our goal here is not to criticize this work, as developing provable defenses is a challenging and important area of work, but rather to show that this problem that we explore with Interpolated Adversarial Training (on adversarial training [12] type defenses) is just as severe with provable defenses, and understanding if the insights developed here carry over to provable defenses could be an interesting area for future work.
Neural Architecture Search [23] was used to find architectures which would achieve high robustness to PGD attacks as well as good accuracy on clean data [4] . This improved accuracy on clean data and generalization to FGSM attacks and a direct comparison to our method is in Table 1 . However, the method of [4] is computationally very expensive as each experiment requires training thousands of models to search for optimal architectures (9360 child models each trained for 10 epochs in [4] ), whereas our method involves no significant additional computation. The trade-off between robustness against adversarial perturbation and accuracy on clean examples has been studied from the view point of distinguishability of distributions of different classes [6] . [13] studied the relationship between the generalization performance of the adversarially trained networks on the unseen adversarial examples and the sample complexity. They observe that a higher sample complexity is needed for a better adversarially robust generalization. In contrast to their work, in this work we focus on improving the generalization performance on the clean examples, while maintaining the robustness on the unseen adversarial examples at the same level.
That adversarial robustness often comes at the expense of generalization on clean data has been investigated by [17] . They presented intriguing data dependent proofs showing that on certain artificially constructed distributions -it is impossible for a robust classifier to generalize as good as a non-robust classifier. How this relates to our results is an intriguing question: Our results suggest that the clean generalization gap between adversarial training and non-robust models can be substantially reduced through better algorithms, but it remains possible that closing the gap entirely on some datasets remains impossible. An important question for future is how much this generalization gap can be explained in terms of inherent data properties and how much can be addressed through better models.
Generalization Theory for Adversarial Training and Mixup A growing literature has suggested that adversarial training leads to models which have higher complexity [20] while another line of work shows that mixup leads to lower complexity models [16] . Our work complements this theoretical research from an experimental perspective: by empirically showing that using mixup (or manifold mixup) and adversarial training together leads to improved generalization without substantially effecting adversarial robustness. Fully understanding the extent to which adversarial robustness can be achieved while forcing the classifier to have low complexity (and thus hopefully better generalization) could be an important area for future work.
Interpolated Adversarial Training
We propose Interpolated Adversarial Training (IAT), which trains on interpolations of different adversarial examples and interpolation of clean examples. We use the techniques of [22] and [18] as ways of interpolating examples. Learning is performed in four steps when training a network with Interpolated Adversarial Training . In the first step, we compute the loss from a clean (non-adversar-ial) batch (also using the same [22, 18] regularizer to combine examples). In the second step, we generate the batch of adversarial examples using an adversarial attack (such as Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [12] or Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7] ). In the third step, we train against these adversarial examples with the original labels, using a technique to combine multiple examples (either Mixup or Manifold Mixup). In the fourth step, we obtain the average of the loss from the clean batch and then adversarial batch and train the network using this loss. This procedure of using both the clean batch and the adversarial batch was used by [12] and we use it in our baseline adversarial training models as well. The detailed algorithm is described in Algorithm Block 1.
As Interpolated Adversarial Training combines adversarial training with either mixup [22] or manifold mixup [18] , we summarize these supporting methods in more detail. The mixup method [22] consists of drawing a pair of samples from the dataset (x i , y i ) ∼ p D and (x j , y j ) ∼ p D and then taking a random linear interpolation in the input spacex = λx i + (1 − λ)x j . This λ is sampled randomly on each update (typically from a Beta distribution). Then the network f θ is run forward on the interpolated inputx and trained using the same linear interpolation of the losses
Here L refers to a loss function such as cross entropy.
The manifold mixup method [18] is closely related to mixup from a computational perspective, except that the choice of layer is selected randomly on each training update, including the input layer.
Adversarial training consists of generating adversarial examples and training the model to give these points the original label. For generating these adversarial examples during training, we used the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack, which is also known as iterative FGSM. This attack consists of repeatedly updating an adversarial perturbation by moving in the direction of the sign of the gradient multiplied by some step size, while projecting back to an L ∞ ball by clipping the perturbation to maximum . Both , the step size to move on each iteration, and the number of iterations are hyperparameters for the attack.
Experiments

Adversarial Robustness
Adversarial attacks can be broadly categorized into two categories: Single-step attacks and Multi-step attacks. We evaluated the performance of our model as a defense against the most popular and well-studied adversarial attack from each of these categories. Firstly, we consider the Fast Gradient Sign Method [7] which is a single step and can still be effective against many networks. Secondly, we consider the projected gradient descent attack [10] which is a multi-step attack. It is slower than FGSM as it requires many iterations, but has been shown to be a much stronger attack [12] . In our experiments we always perform adversarial training using a 7-step PGD attack but we evaluate on a variety of attacks: FGSM, PGD with a varying number of steps (we show robustness up to 1000 steps) and hyperparameters. 
Compute loss on clean datã
Run attack (e.g. PGD [12] )
Update parameters using gradients g (e.g. SGD ) end for
The goal of our experiments is to provide empirical support for our two major assertions: that adversarial training hurts performance on clean data (which is consistent with what has been previously observed) and to show that this difference can be reduced with our Interpolated Adversarial Training method. Finally, we want to show that Interpolated Adversarial Training is adversarially robust and does not suffer from gradient obfuscation [1] .
We conducted experiments on competitive networks on two benchmark datasets (CIFAR10 and SVHN) to demonstrate that Interpolated Adversarial Training can improve the generalization performance without sacrificing the adversarial robustness. We used two architectures : First, the WideResNet architecture proposed in [8, 21] and used in [12] for adversarial training 3 . Second, the Pre-ActResnet18 architecture which is a variant of the residual architecture of [8] . We used SGD with momentum optimizer in our experiments. We ran the experiments for 200 epochs with initial learning rate is 0.1 and it is annealed by a factor of 0.1 at epoch 100 and 150. We use the batch-size of 64 for all the experiments.
The data augmentation and pre-processing is exactly the same as in [12] . Namely, we use random cropping and horizontal flip for CIFAR10. For SVHN, we use random cropping. We use the per-image standardization for pre-processing. For adversarial training, we generated the adversarial examples using a PGD adversary using a ∞ projected gradient descent with 7 steps of size 0.0075, and Table 1 . CIFAR10 results on robustness (error rates in %) to white-box attacks on WideResNet20-10 evaluated on the test data (the evaluation on the training examples is in the parentheses). The rows correspond to the training mechanism and columns correspond to adversarial attack methods. For PGD, we used a ∞ projected gradient descent with size α = 2, and S = 8. For FGSM, we used ε = 8. Our method of Interpolated Adversarial Training improves the accuracy on clean test data and improves the robustness to adversarial attacks. The method of [4] is close to our method in terms of accuracy on clean data however it needs several orders of magnitude more computation (it trains 9360 models) for its neural architecture search. 6 .48 (0.01) 11.5 (0.85) 34.5 (13.39) 51.07 (20.98) = 0.03. For the adversarial attack, we used an FGSM adversary with ε = 0.03 and a PGD adversary with 7 steps and 20 steps of size 0.0075 and = 0.03.
In the Interpolated Adversarial Training experiments, for generating the adversarial examples, we used PGD with the same hyper-parameters as described above. For performing interpolation, we used either Manifold Mixup with α = 2.0 as suggested in [18] or Mixup with alpha = 1.0 as suggested in [22] . For Manifold Mixup, we performed the interpolation at a randomly chosen layer from the input layer, the output of the first resblock or the output of the second resblock, as recommended in [18] .
The results are presented in Table 1 , Table 2 , Table 3 and Table 4 . We observe that IAT consistently improves clean generalization error relative to models using Table 2 . SVHN results on robustness (error rates in %) to white-box attacks on WideResNet20-10 using the 26032 test examples (the evaluation on the training examples is in the parentheses). The rows correspond to the training mechanism and columns correspond to adversarial attack methods. For PGD, we used a ∞ projected gradient descent with size α = 2, and S = 8. For FGSM, we used ε = 8. Our method of Interpolated Adversarial Training improves the accuracy on clean test data and improves the robustness to adversarial attacks in few cases. just adversarial training. We also note that the degree of adversarial robustness remains approximately unchanged.
Transfer Attacks
As a sanity check that Interpolated Adversarial Training does not suffer from gradient obfuscation [1] , we performed a transfer attack evaluation on the CIFAR-10 dataset using the PreActResNet18 architecture. In this type of evaluation, the model which is used to generate the adversarial examples is different from the model used to evaluate the attack. As these transfer attacks do not use the target model's parameters to compute the adversarial example, they are considered black-box attacks. In our evaluation ( Table 5 ) we found that black-box transfer were always substantially weaker than white-box attacks, hence Interpolated Adversarial Training does not suffer from gradient obfuscation [1] .
Varying the number of iterations and for Iterative Attacks
To further study the robustness of Interpolated Adversarial Training , we studied the effect of changing the number of attack iterations and the range of the adversarial attack . Some adversarial defenses [5] have been found to have increasing vulnerability when exposed to attacks with a large number of iterations. We directly studied this ( Table 7 ) and found that both adversarial training and Interpolated Adversarial Training have robustness which declines only slightly with an increasing number of steps, with almost no difference between the 100 step attack and the 1000 step attack. Additionally we varied the to study if Table 5 . Transfer Attack evaluation of Interpolated Adversarial Training on CIFAR-10 reported in terms of error rate (%). Here we consider three trained models, using normal adversarial training (Adv), IAT with mixup (IAT-M), and IAT with manifold mixup (IAT-MM). On each experiment, we generate adversarial examples only using the model listed in the column and then evaluate these adversarial examples on the target model listed in the row. Note that in all of our experiments white box attacks (where the attacking model and target models are the same) led to stronger attacks than black box attacks, which is evidence against gradient obfuscation [1] . Interpolated Adversarial Training was more or less vulnerable to attacks with different from what the model was trained on. We found that Interpolated Adversarial Training is somewhat more robust when using smaller and slightly less robust when using larger (Table 6 ). 
Analysis of the complexity of the trained models
In this section, we present the analysis of the networks learned using Interpolated Adversarial Training . The spectral complexity measure proposed by [2] suggests that the complexity of a deep network is a function of the frobenius norm and spectral norm of its weight matrices and that this spectral complexity can be used to prove a generalization bound. We computed both of these norms on a Figure 1 ). We found that Adversarial Training increases the weight matrices frobenius norms across all the layers and increases the spectral norm of the majority of the layers. This is preliminary evidence that Interpolated Adversarial Training learns lower complexity classifiers than normal adversarial training. Fig. 1 . We analyzed the frobenius and spectral norms of the weight matrices on a 6-layer network. Generally Adversarial Training makes these norms larger, whereas Interpolated Adversarial Training brings these norms closer to their values when doing normal training.
Conclusion
Robustness to adversarial examples is essential for ensuring that machine learning systems are secure and reliable. However the most effective defense, adversarial training, has the effect of harming performance on unperturbed data. This has both theoretical and practical significance. As adversarial perturbations are imperceptible (or barely perceptible) to humans and humans are able to generalize extremely well, it is surprising that adversarial training reduces the model's ability to perform well on unseen data. This degradation in generalization is critically urgent to practitioners whose systems are threatened by adversarial attacks. With current techniques those wishing to deploy machine learning systems need to consider a severe trade-off between performance on normal data and robustness to adversarial examples, which may mean that security and reliability will suffer in important applications. Our work has addressed both of these issues. We proposed to address this by using interpolations [22, 18] of adversarial examples during training. We found that this strikingly improves generalization on clean data while preserving adversarial robustness.
